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I. Introduction  
Discrimination in the labor market occurs whenever one  
person is treated preferentially over another even though both  
individuals are equally productive except for some  
characteristic such as gender.  While each employer may have  
individual likes or dislikes, discrimination usually involves  
a common taste or preference on the part of one social group  
against another, making discrimination a sociological  
phenomena.  Symptoms of discrimination in the labor  market  
are the earnings gap between males and females (wage  
discrimination) and the differences in the relative number of  
men and women hired for each occupation (occupational  
segregation).  Although an earnings gap may persist  
due to legitimate market-related factors such as work  
experience or education, it may also persist if employers  
systematically reward women differently than men with respect  
to pay and promotions.  On the other hand, occupational  
segregation may exist if women choose to enter professions  
which tend to pay less or if employers systematically hire  
women for lower paying occupations despite productive  
capabilities.  
Both the male-female earnings gap and occupational  
segregation exist in the U.S. economy.  In 1994, female year- 
round full-time workers earned only 76% as much as their male  2 
counterparts, indicating a substantial earnings gap.'  
Occupational segregation was also evident in 1991 when 55.9%  
of all elementary school teachers were female. In comparison,  
only 5.6% of all civil engineers, a relatively higher paying  
occupation, were women.2  
Differences also exist between industries in the extent  
to which women are treated differently than men in the labor  
market. Industry data shows both wage differentials between  
men and women and differences in the relative number of women  
and men hired. For example, the ratio of wages of female to  
male engineers ranges from a low of .45 in the railroad  
locomotives and equipment industry to a high of 1.98  in the  
metalworking machinery industry.3,4  Similarly, the relative  
number of women engineers ranges from a low of .2  in the  
paperboard, container and boxes industry to a high of 3 in the  
fabricated textile products industry.5  
'Employment and Earnings, Jan 1995, Table No. 37, pg.  
207.  
2Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, Table  
No. 629, pg. 392.  
3The ratio of wages is defined here to be the mean of  
female wages divided by the mean of male wages. Source:  
Extracted data from 1990 Census of Population and Housing.  
4The metalworking machinery industry encompasses the  
manufacturing of metal machinery products such as  
bulldozers, machine tools, power driven portable tools,  
saws, and electric welding wire.  
5 "Relative" here refers to the number of women divided  
by the number of men.  Source: Extracted data from the 1990  
Census of Population and Housing.  3 
Such inter-industry variance in the wage differential and  
the number of women hired relative to men could reflect  
differences in the occupational composition of the industries.  
For example, industries which employ a large number of low- 
paid secretaries will undoubtedly have higher relative numbers  
of women in their work force and also lower wage ratios than  
industries which consist primarily of high wage engineers.  
Yet, industry differences exist even for narrow occupational  
classes. Such differences suggest that the degree of  
discrimination against women may vary among industries.  
In the last thirty years, there have been significant  
increases in the labor force participation rate of women,  
changes in labor law, and an overall increase in the education  
of women.  The increase in both the labor force participation  
of women and the female to male ratio of labor force  
participation can be seen in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate6  
Year  Males  Females  Female/Male 
Ratio 
1960  83.3%  37.7%  49.8% 
1990  76.0%  57.5%  83.0% 
6Monthly data seasonally adjusted  
Source:  Economic Report of the President, pg.308, pg. 311  4 
The female-to-male participation ratio has almost doubled  
since the 1960's.  The increase in the labor force  
participation by women undoubtedly increased the number of  
women hired.  (However, if the increase is not uniform across  
industries, the ratio of females hired to males hired may  
increase unproportionately for certain occupations.)  Over  
time, the occupational composition of industries may also  
change as formerly male dominated occupations become  
infiltrated by women, or vice-versa.  
There have also been significant changes in social  
attitudes and in the law regarding sex discrimination since  
the 1960's.  Changes in the law reflect the changing attitudes  
of society which should affect the wage differential over  
time. Table 2 summarizes some of these important changes.  
Table 2:  Changes in Law Regarding Discrimination Against Sex  
Since 19607  
Equal Pay Act of 1963	  First modern employment  
discrimination statute.  
Imposes an obligation on  
employers to provide "equal  
pay" for men and women who  
perform "equal work" with in  
an establishment unless the  
difference in pay is based on  
a seniority or merit system  
or some other "factor other  
than sex."  
7H1 11, pg. 51, 52 and Player, pg. 19, 20.  Table 2 (Continued):  5 
Title VII of the  Title VII is one title of the 
Civil Rights Act of  omnibus civil rights bill of 
1964, 42 USCA  1964.  It prohibits 
discrimination by race, sex, 
color, religion and national 
origin. It reaches employers, 
labor organizations and 
employment agencies. 
Title VII of the  It gives the EEOC (the Equal 
Civil Right Act is  Employment Opportunity 
amended in 1972.  Commission) the authority to 
initiate civil suits in 
federal district courts, seek 
injunctions and other 
remedies for unlawful 
practices committed by 
employers, labor unions, 
joint labor management 
committees, employment 
agencies and other 
institutions covered by the 
original Act.  A new Office 
of the General Counsel is 
authorized to conduct 
litigation on behalf of the 
commission.  The amended act 
extends coverage to every 
employer "engages in an 
industry affecting commerce" 
with 15 or more members. 
This coverage adds 
approximately 6 million 
private industry employees to 
EEOC's jurisdiction. 6  Table 2 (Continued):  
Effective  Requires employers with  
Approximately 1978- federal service and supply  
Executive Order  contracts and employers  
112468  performing federally financed  
construction to undertake  
"affirmative action."  It  
reinforces Title VII in terms  
of prohibiting discrimination  
in terms of race, sex and  
national origin.  It also  
directs contracting employers  
to undertake a "utilization  
analysis" to determine the  
extent to which qualified  
women and minorities are  
under-represented in the  
various job categories of the  
employers work force relative  
to their general availability  
in the relevant job market.  
1991-Congress passed  Congress prohibits  
extensive amendments  discriminatory adjustment of  
in the Civil Rights  test scores, limits  
Act.  challenges to judicially  
affirmed affirmative action  
plans, allows for jury  
trials, defines time to  
challenge seniority systems  
and allows damages for  
intentional discrimination.  
With the change in attitudes and law, firms within  
industries may no longer be able to practice discrimination;  
they may be forced to hire more women and close the wage gap.  
Finally, women have been attaining higher educational levels  
over time.  In 1960, almost twice as many males as females  
8Executive Order 11246, 26 Federal Register 2477, 41  
CFR parts 60-1 and parts 60-2.  7 
were enrolled in college.  Thirty years later, the number of  
women outnumber the men as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3:  College Enrollment, by Sex and Level (in millions)9  
Year  Male  Female 
1960  2.3  1.2 
1990  6.2  7.4 
If education is, in fact, a measure of productivity, and  
if all employees within the same industry and occupation have  
the same quality and years of schooling, then females should  
be equally productive as males and would thus be expected to  
receive the same compensation.  
Despite these historical trends, evidence shows that wage  
differentials still occur between men and women within the  
same occupations and across industries. It is the purpose of  
this paper to examine male/female wage differentials and the  
relative number of men and women, across both occupations and  
industries.  The role of market power within a particular  
industry as well as productivity differences such as  
education, will be considered as possible determinants of the  
existing differences.  
9Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, Table  
No. 231, pg. 156.  Data for college represent degree-credit  
enrollment.  8 
This study is an extension of one by Sharon Oster (1975)  
who examined industry market power as a possible determinant  
of industry-specific discrimination against women.  In her  
regressions, Oster uses 1960 data and examines the relative  
number of men and women hired.  She finds that the  
coefficients on the market power variable are of the right  
sign, but almost all are insignificant.10 This paper will re-
estimate Oster's model using data from 1990 and then build  
upon Oster's original model to make it more theoretically  
complete.  The remainder of this paper is organized as  
follows:  Section II reviews the literature on male/female  
labor market differences.  Theoretical issues are examined in  
section III.  Oster's empirical model is presented, re-
estimated and revised in section IV.  Section V discusses the  
data used. Empirical results are presented in section VI  
followed by conclusions.  
10For the market power coefficients, a negative sign is  
expected.  9 
II. Survey   of Literature  
Studies comparing the earnings of men and women have  persistently found a pay differential   favoring men. Adjusting  for both supply and demand side factors reduces the observed  differential but does not eliminate it (Hartmann and Treiman  (1981), Cain (1986)].  Most economic   literature attributes the  causes of labor market wage and   employment 
sex to three  differentials by  major factors (which are often  
1)  Differences in personal   inter-connected):  
characteristics such as education  or experience   which lead to   differences in quality or  productivity as described by   human-capital theories,  2) The psychic costs men   experience when working with women,  "taste  
discrimination" as discussed   for example by Becker  (1957),   Alchian-Kessel  (1962) and Arrow  (1971), and  3) Women's   relative lack of job choice   resulting in a poorer  bargaining position and   monopsonistic   exploitation in the  labor market.  
Much literature and research has been based on the  "human capital" approach which suggests that investment in  human beings produce an intangible   form of capital that is  significant in production.   The theory implies that  investments in human capital increase labor   productivity and  thus are one of the more valuable labor  
characteristics to  employers.  Most studies find that both education and training  10 
contribute to greater earnings (Eck, 1993). In order for males  
and females to earn equal wages, both parties must receive the  
same quality and quantity of education and training, or  
productivity differences will warrant unequal wages.  
Polachek (1978) and Gerhart (1990) find that men and  
women are unequally distributed across fields of study in  
college that have different average starting salaries.  Blau  
and Ferber (1991) find that women anticipate considerably  
lower earnings in subsequent years, even under the assumption  
of continuous employment.  Rudd and Sanik (1983) find that  
work plans are related to education.  Therefore, at least some  
earnings differentials may be explained by unequal investment  
in human capital (Malkiel and Malkiel, 1973, Ayers, 1978 and  
Polachek, 1975).  
Supply side arguments also complement the human capital  
model.  For example, it is argued that women are at a  
disadvantage in career advancement because they do not have  
the same priorities as men.  Due to the traditional division  
of labor in the family, women may seek jobs requiring less  
effort (Becker, 1985).  It is argued that women are less  
concerned with professional progress and intellectual  
challenges and more with comfort, flexible hours and a  
pleasant work environment [Filer (1985), Daymont and Adriani  
(1988)].  Lower anticipated earnings for equally qualified  
women, regardless of their cause, are likely to introduce  
feedback effects as suggested by Gronau (1981) and Blau &  11 
Ferber (1986).  Thus, women may plan to get less education and  
spend less time in the labor market in part because of lower  
expected rewards.  These, in turn, further depress female  
earnings.  
Existing studies [Oaxaco (1973)] consistently find that,  
even after controlling for differences in human capital, there  
is still a wage gap that might be explained by discrimination.  
Prejudice or preference for not associating with women under  
some circumstances may interact with market forces to produce  
discrimination against women.  The form of the observed  
discrimination may be either unequal numbers of women and men  
hired, or unequal wages. (Please refer to section III.) Becker  
(1957) and Alchian and Kessel (1962) have argued that the  
extent of discrimination by employers is related to the degree  
of market power such firms possess.11  In recent empirical  
testing of the hypothesis either employment or wage  
discrimination is presumed to vary by market structure.  
Typically, the portion of minority employment in an industry  
is regressed against a variety of industry characteristics  
including concentration ratio.  Most models use the following  
industry characteristics:  percentage of unionization,  
11Oaxaco  (1973) applied Becker's theory and pioneered  
the residual method of measuring market discrimination.  
Using the residual approach, the wage gap is decomposed into  
1) the earnings gap that the minority receives in the  
absence of discrimination given their set of income-earning  
characteristics and 2) the unexplained "residual" amount  
represents the portion of the earnings gap which occurs due  
to market discrimination and cannot be attributed to  
productivity differences.  12 
regional variables indicating the percentage of industry  
employment by geographical area, firm size and occasionally  
experience and education between majority and minority  
employees. Almost every study examines the black versus white  
racial issue.  Most studies find a negative coefficient on the  
concentration measure, but existing empirical tests are  
ambiguous.  
Comanor (1973) finds that estimated measures of racial  
discrimination are generally higher in more skilled  
occupations, more profitable industries, and in industries  
located in large metropolitan areas.  He finds discrimination  
is the greatest in the most profitable industries.  Haessel  
and Palmer (1978) suggest a trade-off exists between  
employment discrimination and the equalization of wages. They  
use wages to find that firms in more highly concentrated  
industries hire fewer minorities than do firms in less  
concentrated industries. Heywood (1987) shows a measure of  
wage discrimination to be approximately twice as great for  
minority workers in concentrated industries as for minorities  
in unconcentrated industries.  
Shepherd and Levine (1973), using a sample of leading  
firms, find that market share makes little or no difference in  
the minority employment of white-collar workers.  Similarly,  
Fujii and Trapani (1978) and Johnson (1978) find no systematic  
relationship between wage discrimination in concentrated and  
unconcentrated industries.  13 
The results on sex discrimination are not clear.  Haessel  
and Palmer (1978) suggest that firms with more monopoly power  
tend to discriminate in favor of women, especially in clerical  
and personnel service occupations. Luksetich (1979) also finds  
a significant negative coefficient on the concentration  
measure as do Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) who examine  
employment differentials due to sex discrimination in the  
banking industry. Oster (1975) finds that industry  
concentration has no effect on the proportion of women  
employees in an industry.  
Interestingly, studies which do not include relative  
wages in their econometric models find  some marginal  
statistical significance for regional variables with the model  
[Oster (1975) and Shepherd & Levin (1973)).  Comanor finds the  
regional variables to be insignificant in explaining relative  
wage differentials for minorities.  
The final explanation of potential wage discrimination  
occurs when prejudice is the result of group behavior, rather  
than its cause (Madden, 1975).   Discrimination in this form  
occurs due to limited job opportunities or immobility in the  
labor market that has been manifested by male economic power.  
This case is different from the human-capital theory approach  
because it suggests women are actually geographically less  
mobile than men.  Luksetich (1979) argues that men collude in  14 
sex discrimination because of their own self-interests.12  
Likewise, Jacobs (1982) shows that males have power over  
female occupational choices in many different ways such  
as place of residence being dictated by the husband's job,  
legislation that bars women from certain jobs, and male  
workers who refuse to work alongside female workers.   Thus,  
women may face a monopsonistic employment situation more often  
than men.  
Joan Robinson (1934) developed the case of a  
discriminating monopsonist,  a single buyer of labor who hires  
labor up to the point where marginal labor cost equals the  
marginal revenue product.  The monopsonist pays workers a wage  
less than their value contribution to the firm; the wage-value  
contribution differential  measures worker exploitation because  
it shows that workers are not paid their "worth."  
Unfortunately, little empirical evidence exists on how  
monopsony actually influences the wages of men and women and  
how sources of economic immobility (e.g. occupational  
segregation, geographic factors) affect the degree of  
monopsonistic exploitation among both genders.13   However,  
two major studies show that women's wages appear to be  
1 2This may or may not include the disutilites men  
experience when working with women.  
13Most studies center on monopsonistic discrimination  
with in a specific industry and a regional labor market  
(Landon and Baird, 1971, Malkiel and Malkiel,  1973, Hoffman,  
1976, Ferber and Kordick, 1978, Luizer & Thorton, 1986, and  
Monk-Turner and Turner, 1994).  15 
significantly more affected by monopsony than men's wages  
[Gordon & Morton (1974) and Cardwell & Rosenzweig (1980)].  
There exists no empirical study that develops a model to  
examine the impact of all of these factors on the female/male  
wage differential.  It is the purpose of this study to fill  
that gap in the literature.  
Recently there has been a wave of inter-industry studies  
of wage differentials both in the US and other countries.14  
For example, Luski and Weinblatt (1994) examine concentration  
ratios and the inter-industry wage structure of the Israeli  
manufacturing sector and find a positive relationship between  
wages and the degree of monopolization.  Lucifora (1993) finds  
that both inter-industry and occupational wage differentials  
in Italy can be explained by either unmeasured workers'  
characteristics or by compensating wage differentials.  In  
the US, there is a growing body of literature which suggests  
that concentration generally has a positive effect on wages,  
especially when the studies have examined the effects of  
inter-industry wage differences  [Dalton and Ford (1977),  
Jenny (1978), Pugel (1980), Long (1983), Kwoka (1983), Martin  
(1984), and Brush & Crane (1989)]. Finally, Bell and Freeman  
(1991) find interindustry wage dispersion is increasing and  
attribute about 60% of the rise to competitive market forces  
14Most studies use manufacturing industries because the  
data is available for industries in the manufacturing sector  
and is well suited to test the regression models (Jones and  
Walsh, 1991).  16 
such as changes in the demographic and occupational mix of the  
industrial sectors.  
Instead of examining average aggregate inter-industry  
male/female wage and employment differences, this study looks  
at these differences for individual occupations across  
industries.  The hypothesis is that male/female differences  
will be greater for the same occupation when market power is  
present.  This allows for a more precise separation into  
occupation specific wage differences which may be caused by  
differences in human capital requirements, and the market  
power/discrimination causes of male/female differentials.  17 
III.  Theoretical Framework/Model  
Becker (1957) first suggested the employer-based model of  
discrimination in his study of black-white labor market  
differences. This model can be applied to the analysis of  
discrimination against women. Discrimination here involves  
a disutility that occurs when one has contact with a member of  
the minority.  If an individual has a "taste for  
discrimination," he acts as if he were willing to pay extra to  
associate with men instead of women.15  The concept of a  
discrimination coefficient (di)  is used in order to define  
each employer's individual taste for discrimination.  If  
employers can hire an employee for wage y, then an employer is  
assumed to act as if y(l+di) were the net cost of hiring a  
women.  Hence, hiring a women increases net costs of an  
employer more than hiring a man.  The di represents a non- 
pecuniary element that can be positive or negative depending  
upon whether the non-pecuniary element is "good" or "bad.")  
The discrimination coefficient can also be measured by  
the difference between the wage that would be offered to a  
woman relative to an equally qualified male majority worker.  
Consequently, the ith employer will have a discrimination  
coefficient, di = Y/Yw  1 where Yw = the wage the employer is  
15The employer may be willing to pay either directly or  
in the form of reduced income (Becker, 1971).  18 
willing to offer a woman. Employers who refuse to hire a woman  
at any wage, have an infinitely large di.  If di< 0 then the  
employer is willing to pay more to an otherwise identical  
female worker and thus discriminates in favor of women  
workers.  A more complete extension of this model specifies  
dii where j represents the jth occupation (Hameresh and Rees,  
1993).  The extent to which employers discriminate differs not  
only from employer to employer, but also according to the  
nature of the work. In this case, there may be discrimination  
in favor of the minority by majority employers.  For example,  
some employers prefer having female secretaries and would be  
offended by having a male worker doing clerical work.  At the  
same time, the employers prefer not to hire women for  
executive positions.  
As shown in the figure that follows, the demand curve Dw  
shows the total number of minority workers that will be  
demanded by employers at various wage rates.  The shape of the  
demand curve, Dw is determined by arranging the job offers of  
employers by the size of their discrimination coefficients,  
di's; employers with the smallest di's are placed furthest to  
the left.  The horizontal portion of Dw represents the labor  
demand of nondiscriminating employers (di = 0) since, if  
majority and minority workers are assumed to be equally  
productive, nondiscriminatory employers would be willing to  
hire minority workers whenever Yw is less than or equal to Ym.  
Beyond the kink point (point X), the remaining employers have  19 
increasing amounts of prejudice  (di > 0) and will only hire  
women at successively lower relative wages.  Finally, if some  
women (or liberal male employers) practiced favoritism towards  
females, their di would be negative and the initial part of  
the demand curve would then lie  above 1.0.  
The theory suggests that the size of the wage  
differential between majority and minority workers depends on  
two factors. First is the size of the minority group.   Other  
things being equal, the larger the supply of minority workers  
in the market, the lower their relative wage should be.   For  
example, if the supply curve were S1, females could all find  
jobs with nondiscriminating employers and wages between the  
two groups would be equal (point X).   With a larger supply of  20 
S2, the relative wage of female workers must fall, Y' to some  
point Z in order to induce prejudiced employers to hire women.  
Note, the wage paid by employers who do not practice  
discrimination will also be Y' since this is where supply and  
demand are equal.  
A second factor in determining the size of the wage  
differential between men and women is the extent of prejudice  
that exists among employers.  If all employers are  
nondiscriminatory, then the female to male wage ratio would  
equal to 1.0 and equal wages would exist in the market  
regardless of the supply conditions (Kaufman, 1994).  
An important implication of Becker's model is that the  
nondiscriminating firm will have lower labor costs than the  
discriminators because the nondiscriminating firm will hire  
equally productive women for lower wages.  If a firm  
discriminates, it will have costs that are greater than the  
lowest possible costs in the long run in a competitive  
economy.  Thus, the firms will have negative profits and will  
be forced out of the market via entry of nonprejudiced  
employers. However, a monopoly has positive economic profits.  
If a monopolist discriminates, the firm's cost is greater than  
the lowest cost possible.  But, the monopolist can still have  
profits greater than zero.  Barriers to entry keep  
nonprejudiced employers out.  Thus, an increase in market  
power means there is more likely a potential to discriminate  21 
and firms can continue to discriminate even in the long run  
(Kaufman, 1994).  
Firms may also have an alternate source of market power  
in the input market that stems from monopsony power and the  
geographical immobility of female workers. If an industry or  
a group of industries is the only employer of a particular  
occupation, then employees have little choice within the  
occupation but to work with that particular group of  
industries.  Since only a few industries need that specific  
occupation, firms within these specific industries can  
exercise more power in the input labor market and may indulge  
in discrimination.  There would be a greater effect if firms  
within an industry possessed high market power in both input  
and output markets.  22 
IV. Empirical Model:  
Oster (1975)   uses Becker's hypothesis to empirically  
test the monopoly-discrimination  relationship.   Oster  
identifies eight occupations and then examines the relative  
number of men and women in these occupations across  
industries.  The model Oster uses is as follows:  
, A  
(-)=130+13ik-) +132(MP)+ P3(GRT)+ (34(E) + (35(WT)  + (36(SD)+ (37(NCD) M M 
where A = Dummy with values -- 0 when the number of women > 0  
and 1 when the number of women = 0  
M = Number of men in the industry i in the occupation a  
W = Number of women in the industry i in the occupation a  
MP = Concentration ratio of industry output 
GRT = Growth rate  
E = Number of employees per establishment 
WT = Percentage of the industry employment in the West 
= Number of Employees in industry i in the West/Number of 
Employees in industry i for the entire US.  
SD = Percentage of the industry employment in the South 
= Number of Employees in industry i in the South/Number of 
Employees in industry i for the entire US.  
NCD = Percentage of the industry employment in the North 
Central region  
= Number of Employees in industry i in the North Central  
region/Number of Employees in industry i for the entire  
US.  
In testing the monopoly model,   Oster used 1960 data on  
professional workers since employers are most likely to  
discriminate against women of higher status who pose the  
greatest "threat" to their status.   Within the class of  
professional workers,  some industries hire more women while  
others hire less women.   Therefore, eight occupations  --23 
accountants, designers, natural scientists, personnel workers,  
technicians, engineers, draftsmen and managers were chosen  
because 1) none was a typically female job and 2)  the  
occupations were not overly industry-specific and therefore  
gave a large sample size.  
The sample included a maximum of fifty-six manufacturing  
Four-firm concentration ratios were used to  industries.  
measure market power and were obtained by aggregating the  
four-digit ratios by share in employment to the appropriate  
Census industry level. A dummy variable was used to  
differentiate between those firms with no women and a lot of  
men and those firms with no women and only a few men.  As the  
value of A moves from 0 to 1, W moves to 0 and W/M decreases;  
thus the 01 coefficient is expected to be negative.  
On the other hand, the market power coefficient,  02 is  
expected to be negative because monopoly power enables  
economic profits to be greater than zero.  An increase in  
market power (MP) means firms with greater monopoly power do  
not have to hire as many women.  As market power is increased,  
the ratio of relative number of women to men moves closer to  
zero.  
The growth rate variable (GRT) indicates the change in  
average employment over a period of time.  As the growth rate  
of an industry is increasing, by definition, the industry is  
hiring more people. An increase in the numbers hired, along  
with changes in attitudes, the law and the supply of women,  24 
would suggest that over time there would also be an increase  
in the number of women hired in proportion to men.  This  
variable is expected to be significant and have a positive  
relationship with the relative number of women hired making  
the coefficient 03 positive.  However, for the 1960's data,  
the opposite is expected to be true; 03 is expected to be  
negative because firms in the 1960's did not have the same  
public pressures that they do in the 1990's.  In addition,  
larger firms before the 1960's faced labor laws that did not  
pressure establishments to increase the relative number of  
women hired.  
For the 1960's data, the coefficient 04  (relating to the  
number of employees per establishment) is expected to be  
negative.  However since then, larger firms are pressured by  
law to increase the relative number of women hired and in the  
recent data set, a positive coefficient, 04 is expected for  
the number of employees per establishment (average) and the  
relative number of women hired.  
Finally, the South (SD), West (WT), and North Central  
variables (NCD) were used by Oster in an attempt to compensate  
for regional variations in the supply of women workers.  
Oster's results are shown in Table 4.  The market power  
coefficients are mostly of the expected signs, but almost all  
are insignificant.  The R2's are low for all eight of the  
occupations chosen, ranging from 0.0302 to 0.2788.  All growth  
rate (GRT) and employees per establishment (E)  coefficients  25  
are insignificant. Most of the coefficients for A/M, MP, GRT,  
and E are of the expected signs.  While, the regional  
variables (WT, SD, and NCD) are mostly of mixed signs and on  
the most part only half of the NCD (North Central) regional  
variable coefficients are significant.  
In order to see how results have changed after thirty  
years, a re-evaluation of Oster's original work has been  
conducted using 1990 data. (Refer to Appendix, Section Al  for  
a discussion of the data used for the 1990 sample.)  Since, it  
is not possible to tell precisely what definitions Oster used,  
the best possible proxy has been found for some variables (see  
Section V). Heteroskedicity has been corrected for using  
weighted least squares (wls) as suggested by Kmenta (1986) 
.16  
Table 5 presents a summary of Oster's model that has been  
estimated using the more current data.  The ordinary least  
squares results are in Appendix,  A8.17  
The re-estimation shows that the parameter estimates are  
usually of the expected signs. The A/M term could not be used  
in many of the models.  This is a reflection of the changes in  
times: due to increased entry of women into traditional male  
occupations, the dummy variable in most cases was 0,  
regardless of the industry.  This created a collinearity  
160ster did not correct for heteroskedicity in her  
original work, even though at least one form of  
heteroskedistic variance existed.  
17The ordinary least squares results are provided for a  
true comparison against Oster's results; her  original work  
did not correct for heteroskedicity.  Table 4: Original Estimation  
Occupation 
Accountants 
t(48) 
R 2= 0.3080 
Intercept 
26.87 
(4.06)*** 
A/M 
-20.16 
(-4.01) 
MP 
-0.003 
(-0.039) 
GRT 
-4.36 
(-0.572) 
E 
-0.006 
(-1.13) 
WT 
-0.028 
(-0.202) 
SD 
-0.215 
(2.20)** 
NCD 
-0.129 
(1.20) 
Engineers 
t(48) 
R 2= 0.0302 
-0.024 
(0.008)*** 
-0.016 
(-0.292)** 
-0.008 
(-0.203) 
-2.16 
(-0.546) 
-0.006 
(-0.194) 
-0.002 
(-0.026) 
0.031 
(0.652) 
0.046 
(0.900) 
Managers 
t(49) 
R2=0.2788 
17.27 
(6.414)*** 
-0.051 
(-1.217) 
-4.65 
(-1.339) 
-0.002 
(-1.022) 
-0.161 
(-2.633)** 
-0.111 
(-2.631) 
-0.096 
(2.114)** 
Personnel 
t(46) 
R2=0.2696 
61.26 
(3.086)*** 
-10.616 
(2.707)*** 
-0.597 
(-2.107)** 
38.936 
(1.537) 
-0.002 
(-0.112) 
-0.664 
(-1.567) 
-0.206 
(-0.669) 
-0.607 
(1.848)** 
Draftsmen 
t(45) 
R 2= 0.2757 
23.42 
(2.212)*** 
-5.547 
(-2.499)** 
-0.289 
(-2.119)** 
8.675 
(0.682) 
0.004 
(0.475) 
-0.365 
(-1.611) 
0.143 
(0.938) 
-0.280 
(-1.691)** 
Natural Scientists 
t(44) 
R2= 0.2214 
-0.035 
(-0.005) 
-3.539 
(-2.462)** 
0.145 
(1.475) 
-7.331 
(-0.843) 
-0.007 
(-1.115) 
-0.108 
(0.653) 
0.061 
(0.597) 
-0.223 
(-2.026)** 
Designers 
t(38) 
R 2= 0.2136 
68.82 
(20.32)*** 
-6.426 
(-1.402) 
-0.067 
(-0.131) 
-52.546 
(-1.290) 
-0.022 
(-0.765) 
-1.290 
(-1.650) 
0.157 
(0.294) 
-0.434 
(-0.823) 
Technicians 
t(47) 
R2=0.1598 
16.25 
(0.422) 
-26.829 
(-2.193)** 
-0.575 
(-1.010) 
34.625 
(0.676) 
-0.013 
(-0.359) 
1.662 
(1.701) 
0.812 
(1.324) 
-0.233 
(-0.357) 
Source: Oster, 1975 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level, **at the 0.025 level, ***at the 0.005 level (Rt-tailed tests) 27 
problem and thus the variable could no longer be used.  The  
1990 results are different than Oster's results in that many  
more variables are significant. The market power coefficient,  
02, was significant in three of the models: accountants,  
managers and technicians. Growth rate was significant in four  
of the models: engineers, managers, personnel service and  
computer scientists and operators.  Similarly, the variable,  
E, was significant in three occupations: computer scientists  
and operators, managers, and technicians.  Out of the three  
regional variable, the coefficients of WT and NCD were the  
most significant in four out of the eight models.  
Interestingly, market power was significant in accountants and  
in managers, whereas in Oster's study, market power was  
significant in personnel workers and draftsmen.  
There are several possible problems with Oster's model.  
First, Oster used the relative number of men and women instead  
of wage differentials.  She did this for two reasons.  First,  
wage differentials by both industry and occupation were not  
available in 1960.  Second, she argued that large,  
concentrated firms were more likely to have no differences in  
wages due to standardized wage scales and would thus engage in  
quantity discrimination.  However, this may be incorrect for  
many firms. Even though the relative number of women may be  
greater than men, women may be systematically receiving lower  
wages than men for equally productive jobs that are  
comparable.  Table 5: Re-estimation of Oster's Model Using 1990 Data and WLS  
Occupation 
Accountants 
t(35) 
R 2= 0.8126, it 2= 0.7804 
Intercept 
15.93 
(4.361)*** 
AIM  MP 
-0.077 
(-2.237)** 
GRT 
0.005 
(0.158) 
E 
0.0019 
(0.759) 
WT 
-15.62 
(-2.183)** 
SD 
3.893 
(0.833) 
NCD 
-13.81 
(-2.792)*** 
Engineers 
t(46) 
R2=0.6719,122 0.6220 
1.1351 
(7.109)*** 
-0.097 
(-0.279) 
0.00249 
(0.978) 
0.0086 
(5.933)*** 
0.000017 
(0.122) 
-1.798 
(-5239)*** 
0.2877 
(1.231) 
-0.5753 
(-1.961)* 
Managers 
t(49) 
-/22= 11 2=0.8384,  0.8186 
2.3404 
(6.386)*** 
0.02234 
(7.601)*** 
0.01567 
(6.287)*** 
-0.000965 
(-4.184)*** 
-1.5754 
e2.506)** 
-0.08567 
(-0.167) 
-1.3866 
(-2.563)** 
Personnel 
t(31) 
R2=0.2575, 122= 0.1138 
6.6493 
(2.110)* 
0.0069 
(0.213) 
0.08494 
(2.503)** 
-0.0005 
(-0.164) 
-6.058 
(-0.890) 
5.063 
(1.142) 
-2.1441 
(-0.464) 
Computer Scientists 
and Operators 
t(41) 
R 2= 0.7623, It 2--- 0.7217 
0.0815 
(0.090) 
-1.731 
(-5.330)*** 
0.0033 
(0.408) 
0.01 
(1.784)* 
-0.0035 
(-5.294)*** 
6.8374 
(3.098)*** 
3.506 
(3.176)*** 
-1.087 
(-1.017) 
Natural Scientists 
t(19) 
R 2= 0.4536, 122= 0.2523 
4.8503 
(1.558) 
-2.015 
(-2.006) * 
0.0206 
(0.915) 
0.0372 
(1.758) 
-0.0015 
(-1.105) 
-6.811 
(-1.664) 
-2.478 
(-0.666) 
-4.2424 
(-0.996) 
Designers 
t(24) 
-12 R2t= 0.3173,  2= 0.1466 
2.4494 
(1.135) 
0.00632 
(0.364) 
-0.0133 
(-0.760) 
0.0017 
(0.903) 
-6.166 
(-1.485) 
6.415 
(4.642) 
-6.932 
(-2.018) * 
Technicians 
t(49) 
R2=03091, R2=0.4489 
-1.7865 
(-1.633) 
0.038 
(3.126)*** 
0.0099 
(1.185) 
-0.002 
(-2.307)** 
2.4052 
(1.359) 
7.572 
(6.089)*** 
1.771 
(1310) 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level, **at the 0.025 level,  **at the 0.005 level (Rt-tailed tests) 29 
Arguments have been made that employers are able to  
successfully bypass the law by changing job titles for  
positions that are comparable in value to pay women less for  
doing the same job without being detected. This could result  
in increases in the relative number of women but not in the  
relative wage.  The inclusion of wages into the model would  
take into account additional information and the ratio of  
relative wages is used here as the dependent variable.18  
Oster's model also ignores the power firms possess in the  
input market (labor market), allowing firms to practice  
discrimination.  Suppose firms in an industry have market  
power in the output market (a high concentration ratio).  
Firms within this industry may not be able to discriminate if  
they have to compete for skilled labor with firms in more  
competitive industries.  Therefore, firms will have to hire  
both women as well as men, at higher wages otherwise the firm  
will risk losing their labor supply to other firms. However,  
firms within an industry may have market power in both the  
input and output markets.  Here firms can indulge in  
discrimination because of the additional market power.  
In this study, it is assumed that the labor market for  
highly skilled labor is national.  It is proposed that a  
variable defined as the number of employees within a  
18Becker's original model called for using the relative  
number of men and women instead of wages because  in the long  
run, only competitive,  nondiscriminatory firms would be able  
to exists. In the long run, wages would be equal.  (Becker,  
1957)  30 
particular occupation and industry divided by the number of  
employees within the particular occupation for the U.S. be  
added to the model to determine the potential for monopsony  
power in the input market and its effect on wages.  
Finally, Oster's low R2's may reflect the fact that she  
A low R2 may also  does not correct for heteroskedasticity.  
indicate omission of variables.  Hartmann and Treiman (1981)  
cite a number of studies which show women may have been  
exposed to pre-market discrimination which causes women to  
receive lower level of education. According to the human- 
capital theory discussed earlier, education determines  
productivity and hence determines wages.  If this is true  
within specific occupations, wages for women will be lower due  
to educational attainment.  Hence, in order to accurately  
examine the portion of male-female wage differential due to  
discrimination, educational differences within occupations as  
well as industries must be controlled for.  In addition, we  
correct for heteroskedicity.  
Experience is another variable that would add information  
to the model. If women have less experience than men,  relative  
wages would obviously be lower regardless of discrimination.  
Unfortunately, data available on experience is not available  
in the Census data being used.  The level of educational  
attainment thus must proxy for a dimension of human capital.  
Modified Oster's Model: The model developed here will use  
wage differentials while trying to capture the effects of pre-31 
market discrimination as well as market power in both the  
input and output markets.  The goal will be to test whether  
market power has the hypothesized discriminatory effects on  
wage differences.  The model is as follows:  
EDi 
(2-if-)=00+131( 
W 
)+ME)+i3,(GRT)
Y,  TOT)+NWP)+133KR)+114( ED, 
where  
Yf/Ym = The relative wage differential of females to  
males  
= Average income of females/Average income of  
males  
This variable has been substituted for the  
relative number of women/men hired which in  
part will be accounted for by the W/TOT  
variable.  
W/TOT = Number of women in industry i, occupation a/ Number  
of men and women in the industry i, occupation a.  
This variable is needed to describe the percent of  
women as compared to men. It has been substituted  
for the A/M variable to avoid the use of the dummy  
variable and to instead use a more descriptive  
variable.  
MP = Concentration ratio of industry output  
ICR = Input concentration ratio  
= Number of all people in occupation a in industry  
i/Number of all people hired for occupation a for  
all industries (all i)  
This variable has been included to analyze market  
power in the labor market.  32 
EDf /EDm = The ratio of mean educational attainment of females  
to the mean educational attainment of males.  
where EDf = Sum of YEARSCHf/Number of Females  
and  EDm = Sum of YEARSCHm/Number of Males  
This variable has been added to capture pre-market  
discrimination as evident by differences in  
educational attainment of females to males.  
E = Dummy with values -- 0 when the number of employees<15  
and 1 when the number of employees>15  
The variable, E has been changed to a dummy variable to  
incorporate the changes in law since the 1960's.  Employers of  
small firms (less than fifteen employees) are not subject to  
the equal opportunity laws as are the large firms.  
GRT = Percentage change in the annual average,  industry  
employment between 1980 and 1990. The particular  
ten year period (between 1980 and 1990)  is used to  
look at long term trends and because by 1980, the  
data of industry employment will reflect changes in  
the law. Under the new law, the industry will hire  
both men and women.  
The dependent variable is Yf/Ym which is the ratio of  
wages of females to wages of males.  If Yf/Ym < 1 then females  
on an average are paid less than men within industry and  
occupation.  The variables WT, SD, and NCD have been  
eliminated.  Oster found them insignificant and there is  
reason to expect a change in the regional attitudes towards  
In particular, attitudes towards the role  sex discrimination.  
of women in the work place have changed since the 1960's. The  
increase in media and mobility of workers has most  likely  33 
contributed to a more homogeneous national attitude towards  
women.  
For W/TOT to increase, the number of women W, has to  
increase relative to the total number of men and women (TOT).  
If W/TOT increases, more women are hired relative to men.  
Becker's theory predicts that an increase in the number of  
women should increase the wage differential if employers are  
discriminators, ceteris paribus.  (As more women enter the  
industry, the supply curve shifts to the right lowering the  
wages, suggesting a negative coefficient for (31.)  An increase  
in W/TOT is consequently expected to result in a decrease in  
the ratio of female to male wages, Yf/Ym.  It is expected that  
the coefficient, pi will be negative.  
As in Oster's model, a negative relationship is expected  
between market power and relative wages for discriminatory  
employers.  An increase in market power means firms can  
continue to pay male labor more and thus the wage differential  
should be greater.  
As discussed above, women's wages may be more affected by  
monopsony power than are men's wages.  Consequently, an  
increase in ICR should move the wage ratio closer to zero,  
implying a negative coefficient for 03.  
Human capital theory suggests that even in the absence of  
discrimination, a positive relationship should exist between  
the ratio of mean educational attainment and the ratio of  
wages. (An increase in YEARSCHf and a decrease in YEARSCHm  34 
should lead to an increase in Yf/Ym.) It is expected that  
there exists a positive coefficient 04 between the between the  
relative educational attainment and wages. Given the upward  
trend in female education, it is expected that Yf/Ym has  
increased over time.  
Firms with fewer than 15 employees (E=0) are not subject  
to the same law as firms with greater than 15 employees (E=1) .  
Thus, as E moves from value 0 to value 1, the relative number  
of women hired by firms is expected to be increased due to the  
law's requirements only in the absence of discrimination.  An  
assumption can also be made that large manufacturing companies  
have standardized hiring practices and wage scales and  
consequently do not discriminate.19  Therefore, a positive  
coefficient for P5 is predicted between the number of  
employees and the ratio of female to male.  
A positive relationship is expected in the growth of an  
industry and the relative wages.  If the growth rate is  
positive, it means that the industry is growing and can hire  
more women relative to men.  As these women are hired, the  
employers will be pressured to pay women higher wages due to  
changes in times.20  Moreover, as an industry grows so does  
19It is curious to also ponder who really is the  
employer in such large manufacturing firms-many managers or  
a few discriminatory employers.  
20However, the following argument could apply here too:  
as companies hire more women,  they may change job titles or  
hire women for different occupations.  35 
the demand for labor. If most men are already hired,  
discriminating firms may be forced to start hiring women.  
Table 6 summarizes the results for the modified model.  
Again, most of the variables are of the expected signs.  This  
model too has been corrected for heteroskedicity as outlined  
by Kmenta (1986). The market power coefficient, 132 is negative  
as expected and significant in four of the eight occupations:  
accountants, natural scientist, and technicians.  
Interestingly, the market power coefficient for ICR, 03 is  
significant for the other three out of four models:  managers,  
personnel service, and designers.  The coefficient on  
educational attainment of females relative to men is positive  
as expected and significant for six occupations.  For  
designers, there is an unexpected negative relation and an  
insignificant relationship for natural scientists. This is not  
surprising since the data for natural scientists show the mean  
educational attainment for males and females to be almost  
identical at 13.47 years and 13.55 years.  The coefficient on  
E is only significant for designers, indicating that legal  
changes may have had an impact as hypothesized.  The growth  
rate is significant in managers, natural scientists, and  
designers.  Table 6: Estimation of Modified Model  
Occupation 
Accountants 
t(35) 
R2=0.7888, a2=0.7526 
Intercept 
-1.1295 
(-5.049)*** 
W/TOT 
0.7919 
(4.003)*** 
MP 
-0.0013 
(-1.743)* 
ICR 
-1.5535 
(-1.303) 
EDVED, 
1.4599 
(7.366)*** 
E 
-0.0023 
(-0.031) 
GRT 
0.00113 
(1.170) 
Engineers 
t(45) 
R2=0.4192, R2=0.3417 
0.07877 
(0.470) 
-0.1434 
(-0.952) 
-0.002157 
(-2.757)*** 
0.0894 
(0.233) 
0.94372 
(5.128)*** 
-0.04071 
(-0.062) 
.000 0(0.3783)7 
Managers 
t(49) 
-R2= R2= 0.3960,  0.3221 
0.7771 
(4.020)*** 
-0.51411 
(-3.783)*** 
0.000922 
(1.590) 
-1.1267 
(-1.904)* 
0.1808 
(0.925) 
0.0319 
(1.435) 
0.0027 
(4.446)*** 
Personnel 
t(31) 
R2=0.2443,122= 0.0980 
-11.905 
(-2.676)** 
63922 
(2.033)* 
0.0289 
(1.472) 
-35.25 
(-2.229)** 
7.404 
(3.014)*** 
0.4931 
(0.826) 
0.0106 
(1.122) 
Computer Scientists 
and Operators 
t(30) 
R 2= 0.4404, R 2= 03285 
0.1408 
(0.608) 
0.1165 
(1.976)* 
-0.0019 
(-1.577) 
-0.6033 
(-0.306) 
0.8023 
(3.391)*** 
-0.0083 
(0.206) 
0.00009 
(0.090) 
Natural Scientists 
t(16) 
R 2= 0.8866, R 2= 0.8441 
1.212 
(2.318)** 
-0.01074 
(-0.040) 
-0.0091 
(-5.607)*** 
-0.6503 
(-1.525) 
0.053991 
(0.131) 
0.14932 
(1.636) 
-0.00436 
(-5.932)*** 
Designers 
t(23) 
R 2= 03924, R 2= 0.2339 
1.60245 
(3.689)*** 
0.71831 
(2.330)** 
-0.0034 
(-1.225) 
-3.8366 
(-1.835)* 
-0.43897 
(-1.818)* 
-0.37514 
(-1.939)* 
-0.0033 
(-2.091)** 
Technicians 
t(49) 
R2=03991, R2=03255 
0.27342 
(1.416) 
0.11967 
(1.257) 
-0.00186 
(-2320)** 
-0.0722 
(-0.135) 
0.58857 
(3.240)*** 
0.0584 
(1.645) 
0.00039 
(0.520) 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level, **at the 0.025 level, ***at the 0.005 level (Rt-tailed tests) 37 
V.  Conclusion  
The data shows the relative number of women is greater  
than men in almost every occupation (see Appendix, section  
A9).  At the same time, wages for women are lower in every  
occupation than are men's wages (see Appendix, section A9).  
Therefore based on relative numbers, it seems females are  
either given preference over males or the supply of females  
workers relative to male workers is larger in certain  
occupations.  But, wage discrimination still seems to persist.  
Consequently, analyzing inter-industry differences provides  
additional information.  
The fact that the inter-industry ratio for the relative  
number of women to men ranges from <1 to >1 suggests women are  
favored in some industries and occupations.  But thirty years  
ago, Oster's study showed that the relative number of men was  
greater than women.  Market power is significant in more of  
the occupations than in Oster's study.  In light of the legal  
changes it is not surprising to see the growth rate and the  
number of employees per firm significant in explaining the  
relative number of females to males hired.  The significance  
of these variables indicates that legal changes may have had  
an impact in certain occupations.  Finally, despite social  
changes, the regional variables are significant more now than  
in Oster's model.  38 
Regardless of whether more women are hired than men or  
vice versa, wage discrimination still persists. That is, for  
the most part, women are paid less within industry and  
occupation.  This study shows that market power in the output  
product market does lead to a difference in the ratio of wages  
for four of the eight occupations.  Out of the remaining four,  
three occupations illustrate market power in the input market  
as significant.  This finding indicates that firms with  
substantial market power can in fact have some degree of  
influence over hiring practices especially in regards to  
compensation as Becker's theory suggests. The policy  
implication is therefore that competition needs to work  
smoothly. The fact that the mean educational ratio is  
significant in six out of the eight occupations suggests that  
despite social changes in attitudes, much more attention is  
needed for females before they enter the labor  market.  
Future research may capitalize on the findings presented  
here and re-examine specific occupation and industries for an  
in-dept analysis. Alternatively, future research can use these  
results to isolate significant variables when studying the  
relative number females to males hired and their wage ratios  
within industries. The final goal being to equalize both  
relative number of females to males and their wage ratios  
within industries and across occupations.  39 
VI.  Data Sources  
1)  1990 Census of Population and Housing  Public Use  
Microdata Samples A (5% Sample) [CD-ROM]. (1990)  
Sudocs Number: C 3.285:CD 90-Pumsal-7.  
2)  US Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor Statistics,  
Supplement to Employment and Earnings, August 1992.  
Sudocs Number: L 2.41/2-2:992  
3) US Department Of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economics  
and Statistics Administration 1987, Concentration  Ratios in  
Manufacturing, Subject Series, MC87-S-6.  
Sudocs Number: C 3.24/12:MC 87-S-6.  
4) US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,  Economic  
and Statistics Administration,  1990 Census Population and  
Housing,  Public  Use  Microdata  Samples,  US,  Technical  
Documentation.  
Sudocs Number: C 3.285:P 96/doc.  40 
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Appendix  48 
Al. Data:  
The original sample has been taken from the 1990  
Census of Population and Housing CD's from the 5% sample of  
the Public Use Micro-data Sample using the occupations and  
industries described below as well as listed in sections A3  
and A4 in the Appendix.21  
Since all occupations used have been professional  
occupations, taking the differences in physical ability of men  
and women into account is not important.  In order to compare  
results with Oster and in order to keep a fairly large sample  
size, the occupations used have been as follows:  
1) Accountants and Auditors  
2) Engineers  
3) Administrative Support and Managerial Occupations  
4) Personnel Service Workers  
5) Computer Scientists and Operators  
6) Natural Scientists  
7) Designers  
8) Technicians and Related Support Occupations  
Economists, lawyers, draftsmen, social scientists, and  
urban planners and mathematical scientists had to be dropped  
due to insufficient observations within the manufacturing  
industries.  
21In order to do this, the Ascii files from the CD's  
were transferred to a temporary directory at an Anonymous  
FTP site from which a SAS program ran and extrapolated the  
original sample.  A maximum number of 57 manufacturing  
industries on the three digit industry level were used on  
which there was data available for both growth rates as well  
as concentration ratios.  All miscellaneous industries have  
been eliminated.  49 
The original sample containing data from the Population  
and Housing CD was organized on the individual level and had  
to be aggregated into the industry level.  In order to get  
the data into working condition, all individuals working part  
time and/or part year were dropped from the sample.22  After  
adjusting for full time, full-year workers, 18,225 individual  
observations were left in the data set.  
The original sample was next separated into two groups:  
males and females.  It was sorted by occupations into the 8  
different occupations listed above and the observations from  
the 57 industries were pooled so the data had the following  
format:  
Men:  
Occupation 1:  
OBS 1  all individual observations pooled within Industry 1 
with variables calculated 
OBS 2  all individual observations pooled within Industry 2 
with variables calculated 
OBS 3  all individual observations pooled within Industry 3 
with variables calculated 
.  . 
.  . 
. 
OBS 57  all individual observations pooled within Industry 57 
with variables calculated 
The same format was used to organize the data for women.  
In the final working sample as shall be explained later,  
22All individuals working less than 34 hours a week and  
less than 47 weeks a year were dropped.  50 
the females outnumbered the men in every occupation except  
Engineers.  
All variables were calculated using the Census of  
Population and Housing Data except for MP, GRT and E.  Four- 
firm concentration ratios coordinating with the appropriate  
Census industry level were obtained from the Census of  
Manufacturing, 1987 for the four digit level.  The 1987 figure  
is the most current available at this time and should be the  
most accurate means of calculating ratios because as 1) the  
1990 industry variable corresponds with the 1987 Census of  
Manufacturing and 2) concentration is relatively stable over  
short periods of time.  
Since, concentration ratios were only available by 4-
digit SIC code, they were aggregated in order to get them into  
the 3-digit form which corresponded to the Census of  
Population and Housing data. The value of shipments in dollars  
($) by 4-digit SIC code was used to calculate a weight by  
which the 4-digit concentration ratio was multiplied.  
Finally, these concentration ratios were aggregated to  
correspond with the 3-digit Census code to obtain the  
variable MP. (The actual data calculation is shown in the  
Appendix).  
Growth rates have been calculated using the differences  
in annual average employment between the years 1980 and 1990  
based on 4-digit SIC codes corresponding to the 1987 SIC  
codes. A ten year growth rate should be accurate for this  51 
measure because changes in the law take time to implement as  
well as to enforce.  Unlike the data on concentration ratios,  
annual average employment data was available on the 3-digit  
SIC level.  But, many of the Census codes include several 3-
digit SIC codes.  So, these SIC codes had to be aggregated and  
weights were used to do this in the same way the Concentration  
ratios were calculated.  (Actual data calculation is in the  
Appendix.)  
The average number of employees per establishment (E) was  
calculated by dividing the number of employees per 3 digit SIC  
code by the total number of companies within the 3 digit SIC  
code. (See Section A7 in the Appendix.)  
For the relative wage differential of females to males  
(Yf/Ym), the variable incomel from the census data was used  
even though hourly income could be easily calculated using the  
number of weeks worked and hours worked.23  Salary income  
seemed to be a more accurate measure for wage for the  
following reasons:  
1) Since, only professional occupations have been used, most  
workers probably have been paid in salary form where  
individuals who work over-time are not compensated directly  
for the additional time spent. 2) Studies show that  
individuals consistently overestimate the number of hours they  
.  
23The variable called Incomel =Wages or Salary Income in  
1989 (signed) was taken from the 1990 Census of Population  
and Housing.  52 
work (Morin, 1985). As a result of the above arguments, only  
full time, full year workers were used.  
The final working sample had the following totals for  
each occupation.  
Table 7: Totals of the Final Working Sample  
Occupation  Males  Females  
Natural Scientists  179  400  
Accountants and  192  1513  
Auditors  
Designers  153  288  
Personnel Service  130  925  
Workers  
Engineers  1248  748  
Computer Scientists  360  1592  
and Operators  
Technicians and  1149  2087  
Related Support  
Administrative  2310  4951  
Support and  
Managerial  
Occupations  
These numbers are quite surprising and at first glance  
raise the concern for the need to test for discrimination when  
clearly women outnumber men in almost every occupation.  
Another puzzling sight is that engineers are the only  
occupation where men outnumber women.  Moreover, for  
accountants and auditors there are almost eight times the  
number of women as men!  53 
Since it is fairly certain the sample obtained is of high  
quality, three other possible explanations are presented here.  
First as discussed in section 1.3, the data may simply  
represent reflections of changing times where women are now  
obtaining higher paying positions, there exist absences in  
discrimination against women or where employers are actually  
favoring women.  If either is the case, both Oster's and the  
modified models should still predict useful results.  In the  
absence of discrimination, relative wages should also be equal  
or greater than 1.  
Second, occupational segregation may have changed over  
time. It may be that now these professional jobs are not as  
"high-status, male-oriented" positions as they used to be in  
the 1960's.  This may be possible for designers, since many  
are employed in typically "female" industries.  Yet, it seems  
unlikely for natural scientists.  Again, both models are  
clearly useful to study the effects of occupational  
segregation.  
The third and most sensible explanation seems to be that  
the data is indicative of the occupations chosen.  Within each  
broad category, occupations are broken down into different  
census codes; the number indicates the status, class of  
workers, type of tasks involved in the job, etc... For  
example, 009 is not is the "same class" as is 303. In fact,  
the 000 series consists of higher paid positions that require  54 
higher levels of formal education and training as compared to  
the 300 series.  (Please refer to Appendix, section A3.)  
The occupations: personnel service workers; computer  
scientist and operators; and administrative support and  
managerial occupations each include mixed suboccupations of  
both the 000 and 300 series.  The large number of women  
appearing in the sample within these three occupations may be  
a reflection of broad definitions picked.  For instance,  
within the sample of personnel workers included is census code  
328-personnel clerks, except payroll and timekeeping.  In  
1989, 91.2% of all employed within this occupation have been  
female.  In contrast, only 52.6% of all personnel and labor  
relations managers (also included in personnel service  
occupations) have been female.24  Similarly, computer  
scientists and operators included computer operators (64.2% of  
which are female); computer systems analysts, scientists (of  
which only 32.4% are female); and operations and systems  
researchers and analysts (of which 41.1% are female).25  
Finally in 1989, females comprised of 80% of all  
administrative support, including clerical occupations held.  
A striking contrast, only 25.9% of all purchasing managers are  
2 4Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991, pg.  
395-397, table no 653.  
25ibia.  55 
women.26  Both have been included into the broad category of  
administrative support and managerial occupations.  
In retrospect it is evident, that the data sample should  
have restrained from using a cross of census codes within each  
occupation.  The variable, YEARSCH (a measure of educational  
attainment differences between males and females) should  
account for any productivity and skill differences within each  
suboccupation to allow for the modified model to still be  
useful in analyzing wages.  
A2. Regional Variables (NCD, SD, and WT):  
Census divisions are groupings of states that are subdivisions  
of the four census regions.  There are nine divisions which  
the Census Bureau adopted in 1910 for the presentation of  
data. They are as follows:  
Northeast Region:  
Maine  
New Hampshire  
Rhode Island  
New York  
Pennsylvania  
Vermont  
Massachusetts  
Connecticut  
New Jersey  
Midwest Region (NCD):  
Ohio  
Indiana  
Illinois  
Michigan  
Wisconsin  
Minnesota  
26ibid.  56 
Iowa  
Missouri  
North Dakota  
South Dakota  
Nebraska  
Kansas  
South Region (SD):  
Delaware  
Maryland  
District of Columbia  
Virginia  
West Virginia  
North Carolina  
South Carolina  
Georgia  
Florida  
Kentucky  
Tennessee  
Alabama  
Mississippi  
Arkansas  
Louisiana  
Oklahoma  
Texas  
West Region (WT):  
Montana  
Idaho  
Wyoming  
Colorado  
New Mexico  
Arizona  
Utah  
Nevada  
Washington  
Oregon  
California  
Alaska  
Hawaii  
A3. List of Occupations:  
For  additional  information  about  each  category  in  the  
industrial and occupational and classification system, the  
individual titles that constitute the category, please refer  
to Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and  
Housing, Classified Index of Industries and Occupations,  
Sudocs Number: C 3.223/22:90-R-4.  57 
Census Code  Occupation  
Natural Scientists:  
069 Physicists and Astronomers  
073 Chemists (except Biochemists)  
074 Atmospheric and Space Scientists  
075 Geologists and Geodesists  
076 Physical Scientists, n.e.c  
077 Agricultural and Food Scientists  
078 Biological and Life Scientists  
079 Forestry and Conservation Scientists  
083 Medical Scientists  
023 Accountants and Auditors  
(Includes  occupations  such  as  Account  Auditor,  Bank  
Accountant, Cost Expediter, Field Auditor, Inspector, Payroll  
Accountant and Tax Expert.)  
185 Designers  
(Includes occupations such as Commercial Designer, Decorator,  
Design Maker, Displayer,  Dress Designer, Display Manager,  
Style Advisor and Textile Designer.)  
Personnel Service Workers:  
008 Personnel and Labor Relations Managers  
027 Personnel, Training and Labor Relations Specialists  
328 Personnel Clerks, except Payroll and Timekeeping  
Engineers:  
043 Architects  
044 Aerospace  
045 Metallurgical and materials  
046 Mining  
047 Petroleum  
048 Chemical  
049 Nuclear  
053 Civil  
054 Agricultural  
055 Electrical and electronic  
056 Industrial  
057 Mechanical  
058 Marine and naval architects  
059 Engineers, n.e.c.  
063 Surveyors and mapping scientists  58 
Computer Scientists and Operators:  
064 Computer Systems Analysts and Scientists  
065 Operations and Systems Researchers and Analysts  
308 Computer Operators  
Technicians and Related Support Occupations:  
213 Electrical and Electronic Technicians  
214 Industrial Engineering Technicians  
215 Mechanical Engineering Technicians  
216 Engineering Technicians, n.e.c.  
217 Drafting Occupations  
218 Surveying and Mapping Technicians  
223 Biological Technicians  
224 Chemical Technicians  
225 Science Technicians, n.e.c.  
226 Airplane Pilots and Navigators  
227 Air Traffic Controllers  
228 Broadcast Equipment Operators  
229 Computer Programmers  
233 Tool Programmers, numerical control  
234 Legal Assistants  
235 Technicians, n.e.c.  
Administrative Support and Managerial Occupations:  
303 Supervisors, General Office  
304 Supervisors, Computer Equipment Operators  
305 Supervisors, Financial Records Processing  
307  Supervisors;  Distribution,  Scheduling,  and Adjusting  
Clerks  
007 Financial Managers  
009 Purchasing Managers  
013 Managers, Marketing, Advertising, and Public Relations  
015 Managers, Medicine and Health  
017 Managers, Food Serving and Lodging Establishments  
018 Managers, Properties and Real Estate  
021 Managers, Service Organizations, n.e.c.  
022 Managers and Administrators, n.e.c.  59  
A4. List of Manufacturing Industries Used:  
This classification  is developed from the  1987  Standard  
Industrial Classification. "n.e.c." is the abbreviation for  
not elsewhere classified.  
1990  
Census  
Code  Industry Category  
100  Meat products  
101  Dairy products  
102  Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables  
110  Grain mill products  
111  Bakery products  
112  Sugar and confectionery products  
120  Beverage products  
121  Miscellaneous food preparations and kindred products  
130  Tobacco manufactures  
132  Knitting mills  
140  Dyeing and finishing textiles, except wool and knit goods  
141  Carpets and rugs  
142  Yarn, thread, and fabric mills  
150  Miscellaneous textile mill products  
152  Miscellaneous fabricated textile products  
161  Miscellaneous paper and pulp products  
162  Paperboard containers and boxes  
171  Newspaper publishing and printing  
180  Plastics, synthetics, and resins  
181  Drugs  
182  Soaps and cosmetics  
190  Paints, varnishes, and related products  
191  Agricultural chemicals  
192  Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals  
200  Petroleum refining  
220  Leather tanning and finishing  
230  Logging  
231  Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork  
241  Miscellaneous wood products  
242  Furniture and fixtures  
250  Glass and glass products  
251  Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products  
252  Structural clay products  
261  Pottery and related products  
270  Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills  
271  Iron and steel foundries  
281  Cutlery, handtools, and general hardware  
282  Fabricated structural metal products  
290  Screw machine products  
291  Metal forging and stamping  
292  Ordnance  60 
300  Miscellaneous fabricated metal products  
310  Engines and turbines  
311  Farm machinery and equipment  
312  Construction and material handling machines  
320  Metalworking machinery  
331  Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c.  
340  Household appliances  
351  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment  
352  Aircraft and parts  
360  Ship and boat building and repairing  
361  Railroad locomotives and equipment  
362  Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts  
380  Photographic equipment and supplies  
381  Watches, clocks, and clockwork operated devices  
390  Toys, amusement, and sporting goods  
391  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  61 
Section A5. Calculation of Concentration Ratios:  
Census 90 Code SIC Codes SIC 4digit  Four firm CR  
100  201	  2011  32  
2013  26  
2015  28  
101  202	  2021  40  
2022  43  
2023  45  
2024  25  
2026  21  
102  203	  2032  59  
2033  29  
2034  39  
2035  43  
2037  31  
2038  43  
110  204	  2041  44  
2043  87  
2044  56  
2045  43  
2046  74  
2047  61  
2048  20  
111  205	  2051  34  
2052  58  
2053  59  
112  206	  2061  48  
2062  87  
2063  72  
2064  45  
2066  69  
2067  96  
2068  43  
120  208	  2083  64  
2084  37  
2085  53  
2086  30  
2087  65  
121  207	  2074  43  62 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
2075  71  
2076  74  
2077  35  
2079  45  
209	  2091  26  
2092  18  
2095  66  
2096  
2097  19  
2098  73  
2099  26  
130  21  2111  92  
2121  73  
2131  85  
2141  66  
132  225  2251  61  
2252  24  
2253  24  
2254  64  
2257  30  
2258  36  
2259  51  
140  226  2261  25  
2262  58  
2269  28  
141  227  2273  34  
142  221  2211  42  
222  2221  35  
223  2231  55  
224  2241  19  
228  2281  22  
2282  49  
2284  58  
150  229	  2295  22  
2296  91  
2297  35  
2298  28  
2299  21  
152  239	  2391  27  
2392  27  
2393  18  
2394  21  63 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
2395  21  
2396  49  
2397  30  
2399  20  
161  267  2671  33  
2672  49  
2673  32  
2674  47  
2675  38  
2676  70  
2677  31  
2678  51  
2679  21  
162  265	  2652  16  
2653  26  
2655  64  
2656  56  
2657  23  
171  271	  2711  25  
180  282	  2821  20  
2822  50  
2823  
2824  76  
181  283  2833  72  
2834  22  
2835  39  
2836  45  
182  284  2841  65  
2842  44  
2843  38  
2844  32  
190  285  2851  27  
191  287  2873  33  
2874  48  
2875  16  
2879  49  
192  281  2812  72  
2813  77  
2816  64  
2819  38  
286  2861  59  
2865  34  64 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
289  
200  291  
210  311  
230  241  
231  242  
243  
241	  244  
249  
242  25  
250	  321  
322  
323  
251  324  
327  
2869  31  
2891  23  
2892  53  
2893  45  
2895  77  
2899  23  
2911  32  
3111  28  
2411  18  
2421  15  
2426  17  
2429  18  
2431  20  
2434  16  
2435  22  
2436  38  
2439  13  
2441  14  
2448  4  
2449  25  
2491  16  
2493  48  
2499  8  
2511  20  
2512  24  
2514  18  
2515  33  
2517  53  
2519  43  
2521  26  
2522  48  
2531  37  
2541  7  
2542  15  
2591  46  
2599  18  
3211  82  
3221  78  
3229  56  
3231  28  
3241  28  
3271   7  65 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
3272   8  
3273  8  
3274  43  
3275  75  
252  325	  3251  29  
3253  65  
3255  35  
3259  39  
261  326	  3261  64  
3262  78  
3263  
3264  41  
3269  28  
270  331	  3312  44  
3313  55  
3315  21  
3316  45  
3317  23  
3321  30  
271  332	  3322  73  
3324  59  
3325  18  
281  342	  3421  49  
3423  25  
3425  45  
3429  32  
282  344	  3441  11  
3442  13  
3443  13  
3444  10  
3446  13  
3448  27  
3449  27  
290  345	  3451  5  
3452  16  
291  346	  3462  22  
3463  60  
3465  59  
3466  54  
3469  9  
292  348	  3482  88  
3483  47  66 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
3484  54 
3489  77 
300  341  3411  54 
3412  30 
343  3431  50 
3432  46 
3433  15 
347  3471  7 
3479  17 
349  3491  20 
3492  38 
3493  38 
3494  20 
3495  36 
3496  11 
3497  57 
3498  9 
3499  13 
310  351  3511  80 
3519  52 
311  352  3523  45 
3524  52 
312  353  3531  48 
3532  22 
3533  34 
3534  52 
3535  17 
3536  19 
3537  35 
320  354  3541  31 
3542  18 
3543  12 
3544  5 
3545  16 
3546  45 
3547  52 
3548  37 
3549  16 
331  355  3552  20 
3553  32 
3554  30 
3555  44 67 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
3556  28  
3559  9  
356  3561  19  
3562  58  
3563  36  
3564  14  
3565  19  
3566  26  
3567  14  
3568  29  
3569  11  
358  3581  52  
3582  36  
3585  31  
3586  57  
3589  12  
359  3592  51  
3593  49  
3594  40  
3596  40  
3599  2  
340  363  3631  66  
3632  85  
3633  93  
3634  38  
3635  69  
3639  54  
351  371  3711  90  
3713  29  
3714  60  
3715  36  
3716  56  
352  372  3721  72  
3724  77  
3728  42  
360  373  3731  49  
3732  33  
361  374  3743  52  
362  376  3761  58  
3764  73  
3769  62  
380  386  3861  77  68 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
381  387  
390  394  
391  39  
excl  394  
3873  45 
3942  34 
3944  43 
3949  13 
3911  12 
3914  57 
3915  29 
3931  31 
3951  49 
3952  54 
3953  22 
3955  37 
3961  26 
3965  33 
3991  19 
3993  6 
3995  59 
3996  82 
3999  14 
D=Withheld to avoid disclosing data for individual  69 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
Value of Shipments $  
5266.9  
4457  
16553.3  
1420.4  
12971  
5856.7  
3916.5  
20590.5  
5350.1  
11889.5  
1821.9  
5050.3  
6606.2  
5624.8  
4984.8  
6565.7  
1234.9  
2625.1  
4788.9  
5069.3  
11468.2  
16221.1  
6290.8  
1165.4  
1239.4  
2460.2  
1831.5  
6979.8  
3107.7  
1090.3  
2178  
530.9  
1380  
3474.3  
21830.4  
4664.8  
470.7  
C01 E Sums  Weights  Wt*CR  
26277.2  0.200436 6.413956  
0.169615 4.409983  
0.629949 17.63858  
44755.1 0.031737 1.269487  
0.289822  12.46233  
0.130861 5.888748  
0.08751 2.187739  
0.46007  9.66148  
36342.8  0.147212  8.685514  
0.327149  9.487312  
0.050131 1.955108  
0.138963  5.975404  
0.181775 5.635014  
0.154771 6.655139  
36736.9  0.135689  5.970324  
0.178722  15.54883  
0.033615  1.882423  
0.071457  3.072641  
0.130357  9.646394  
0.137989  8.417349  
0.312171 6.243423  
23677.3 0.685091 23.29309  
0.265689  15.40997  
0.04922 2.903988  
18886.9 0.065622  3.149866  
0.13026 11.33259  
0.096972  6.981982  
0.369558  16.6301  
0.164543  11.35344  
0.057728  5.541873  
0.115318  4.958675  
31880.4 0.016653  1.065783  
0.043287  1.601611  
0.108979  5.775897  
0.684759  20.54278  
0.146322 9.510922  
44996.9 0.010461  0.449811  Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
9074.1  0.201661  14.3179 
431.5  0.00959 0.709627 
1753.1  0.03896 1.363616 
4151.1  0.092253 4.151386 
767  0.017046 0.443186 
5783  0.12852 2.313359 
6400.6  0.142245 9.388193 
5040.8  0.112025  0 
289.6  0.006436 0.122284 
1048.1  0.023293  1.700368 
9787.3  0.217511 5.655274 
17372  20757 0.836922 76.99687 
191.5  0.009226 0.673484 
1114.3  0.053683 4.563063 
2079.2  0.100169 6.611129 
1497.5  13530.6  0.110675 6.751179 
1952.1  0.144273  3.462552 
3264.9  0.241298  5.79114 
1058.1  0.078201 5.004833 
3578.5  0.264475 7.934238 
1991.9  0.147214  5.299721 
187.6  0.013865 0.707108 
1385  7041.7 0.196685 4.917136 
4391.9  0.623699  36.17453 
1264.8  0.179616  5.02924 
9795  9795  1  34 
5508.3  26020.9  0.211688  8.890876 
8048.9  0.309324  10.82635 
1050.7  0.040379  2.220849 
1135.7  0.043646 0.829268 
7517.5  0.288902  6.355852 
2124.2  0.081634  4.000085 
635.6  0.024427  1.416738 
1433.7  6398.3 0.224075 4.929653 
1005  0.157073  14.29364 
1966.1  0.307285  10.75497 
541.1  0.084569 2.367941 
1452.4  0.226998 4.766954 
1539.6  15743.9  0.09779 2.640337 
4530  0.28773 7.768723 
571.5  0.0363  0.653396 
1066.2  0.067721  1.422151 71 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
728  0.04624 0.971043 
4564.5  0.289922  14.20617 
302  0.019182  0.575461 
2442.1  0.155114  3.102281 
2416  36164.9 0.066805 2.204569 
5891.7  0.162912  7.982693 
4576.9  0.126556 4.049805 
2448  0.06769 3.181427 
1749.3  0.04837  1.838064 
11698.4  0.323474  22.64317 
2598.1  0.07184  2.227052 
1216.4  0.033635  1.715376 
3570.1  0.098717  2.073063 
436.5  25862.7  0.016878  0.270041 
16104  0.622673  16.18949 
1533.9  0.059309  3.795799 
2083  0.080541 4.510279 
5705.3  0.2206  5.07379 
31850.1  31850.1  1  25 
26245.5  40851.4  0.642463  12.84925 
3283  0.080364 4.018222 
1319.7  0.032305  0 
10003.2  0.244868  18.60997 
3350.2  39263.4  0.085326 6.143492 
32094.1  0.817405 17.98291 
2205  0.056159 2.190208 
1614.1  0.04111 1.849929 
11558.5  34747.5  0.332643 21.62177 
5593.9  0.160987 7.083433 
3002.2  0.0864  3.283217 
14592.9  0.41997 13.43903 
12702.4  12702.4  1  27 
2447.2  14267.3 0.171525 5.660328 
3819.3  0.267696 12.84941 
1701.1  0.119231 1.907691 
6299.7  0.441548 21.63586 
1547.9  87714 0.017647  1.270593 
2617.8  0.029845  2.298044 
2388.3  0.027228  1.742609 
13219.8  0.150715  5.727163 
486.5  0.005546  0.32724 
8859.4  0.101003  3.434111 72 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
41812.1  0.476687  14.77729 
4678.1  0.053334  1.226672 
1117.8  0.012744  0.675416 
2391.7  0.027267  1.227016 
569.6  0.006494  0.500025 
8025  0.091491 2.104282 
118186.2  118186.2  1  32 
2218.6  2218.6  1  28 
10938.2  10938.2  1  18 
17357.1  41834.3  0.414901 6.223518  
1714  0.040971  0.69651  
149.2  0.003566 0.064196  
9326.9  0.222949 4.458973  
4378.2  0.104656  1.674492  
2060.5  0.049254 1.083585  
4919.6  0.117597 4.468697  
1928.8  0.046106 0.599374  
325  10399.4  0.031252 0.437525  
1496.1  0.143864 0.575456  
248.3  0.023876 0.596909  
2169.6  0.208627 3.338039  
2864.9  0.275487 13.22338  
3295.5  0.316893 2.535146  
7982  37461.9  0.21307 4.261396  
5263.1  0.140492  3.37181  
2141.2  0.057157  1.028821  
2417.3  0.064527  2.129387  
351.1  0.009372  0.496726  
403.9  0.010782  0.46361  
2084.1  0.055633  1.446446  
5453.6  0.145577  6.987708  
2088.3  0.055745  2.062552  
2815.9  0.075167  0.526169  
2721.3  0.072642  1.089627  
1780.4  0.047526 2.186178  
1959.7  0.052312 0.941613  
2549.3  16317.3 0.156233  12.8111  
4777.9  0.292812 22.83933  
3560.9  0.218229  12.2208  
5429.2  0.332727 9.316345  
4335.4  28762 0.150734 4.220541  
2245.5  0.078072 0.546502  7"  
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
5828.4  0.202642  1.621139 
12966.3  0.450814  3.606509 
715.5  0.024877 1.069693 
2670.9  0.092862  6.964658 
1254  2914.8 0.430218 12.47633 
717.4  0.246123  15.99801 
788.2  0.270413  9.464457 
155.2  0.053246 2.076575 
790.6  2415.9 0.327249  20.94391 
298.4  0.123515 9.634174 
93  0.038495  0 
714.2  0.295625 12.12062 
519.7  0.215117  6.023263 
15804.7  36264.5 0.435817  19.17597 
843.8  0.023268  1.279736 
3330.3  0.091834  1.928506 
5216.3  0.14384  6.472818 
3856.3  0.106338  2.445778 
7213.1  0.198903  5.967075 
283.4  3414.6 0.082997  6.058748 
1450.8  0.424881  25.068 
1680.4  0.492122  8.858197 
1054  13480.7  0.078186 3.831107 
3605.6  0.267464  6.686596 
674.9  0.050064  2.252887 
8146.2  0.604286 19.33716 
8678  40416.1 0.214716 2.361881 
6591  0.163079  2.120021 
6810.2  0.168502  2.190528 
9698.9  0.239976  2.399761 
2268.8  0.056136  0.729769 
3137.8  0.077637  2.096209 
3231.4  0.079953  2.158739 
2806.2  7890.2  0.355656 1.778282 
5084  0.644344  10.3095 
3003.6  28409.8  0.105724  2.32593 
1003.7  0.035329 2.119761 
15251.6  0.536843  31.67373 
819.8  0.028856 1.558237 
8331.1  0.293247 2.639227 
889.2  7643.6 0.116333 10.23727 
3983.2  0.521116 24.49244 74 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
1093.1  
1678.1  
11013.6  
1100  
803.4  
2355.4  
2124  
3866.9  
3922.6  
4590.6  
2451.5  
458.5  
2377.3  
1580.4  
2720.8  
2286.6  
1725.5  
6148.6  
3447.8  
11122.6  
6879.9  
4594.4  
12767.7  
1518.1  
2728.3  
1084.4  
3408.2  
675.4  
2440.2  
3189.5  
1396.3  
499.4  
7550.1  
3601  
2161.8  
467.8  
2104.6  
1033  
1240.7  
884.3  
1867.1  
2857.8  
0.143009 7.722461  
0.219543  16.90482  
49525.7 0.222382  12.0086  
0.022211 0.666321  
0.016222  0.811094  
0.047559 2.187721  
0.042887  0.643302  
0.078079 0.546551  
0.079203  1.346456  
0.092691 1.853825  
0.0495 1.880983  
0.009258  0.351797  
0.048001 0.960027  
0.031911 1.148785  
0.054937  0.604308  
0.04617  2.631688  
0.03484  0.313564  
0.12415  1.613946  
14570.4  0.23663  18.93043  
0.76337  39.69522  
11474.3  0.599592  26.98165  
0.400408 20.82121  
24622.3  0.518542  24.89002  
0.061655  1.356421  
0.110806 3.767406  
0.044041 2.290152  
0.138419 2.353127  
0.02743  0.521178  
0.099105 3.468685  
22003.5 0.144954 4.493581  
0.063458  1.142246  
0.022696 0.272357  
0.343132  1.715659  
0.163656 2.618493  
0.098248  4.42116  
0.02126 1.105533  
0.095648 3.538992  
0.046947 0.751153  
75388.5 0.016457 0.329148  
0.01173 0.375357  
0.024766 0.742991  
0.037908 1.667936  75 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
1971.4  0.02615 0.732197 
8274.7  0.109761 0.987847 
3998.3  0.053036 1.007683 
3723.7  0.049393  2.864822 
3050.9  0.040469  1.456885 
2272.4  0.030143  0.421995 
2189.9  0.029048  0.551916 
1569  0.020812  0.541117 
1434.8  0.019032  0.266449 
2041.1  0.027074  0.785158 
3840.4  0.050941 0.560356 
714.6  0.009479 0.492903 
455.8  0.006046 0.217657 
8051.1  0.106795 3.310639 
1068.7  0.014176 0.808026 
3960.4  0.052533  0.630399 
2287.4  0.030341 1.547416 
1896.6  0.025158  1.232726 
1404.4  0.018629 0.745153 
633  0.008397  0.33586 
13700  0.181725  0.363451 
3395.8  16497.7 0.205835  13.58509 
3518.9  0.213296  18.13019 
3034.8  0.183953  17.10762 
2825.7  0.171278  6.50858 
1324.2  0.080266  5.538336 
2398.3  0.145372 7.850076 
133345.6  205923 0.647551 58.27957 
4588.7  0.022284  0.646224 
62068.4  0.301416  18.08493 
3433.5  0.016674 0.600253 
2486.8  0.012076 0.676276 
39092.7  77304.1  0.5057  36.41042 
20262.1  0.262109 20.18239 
17949.3  0.232191 9.752013 
8504.4  13856.9  0.61373  30.07279 
5352.5  0.38627  12.7469 
2470.9  2470.9  1  52 
21565.8  26285.1 0.820457  47.58652 
3537.1  0.134567 9.823371 
1182.2  0.044976 2.788515 
19240.5  19240.5  1  77 76 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
1220.9  
294  
3381.3  
5123  
4078.1  
528.7  
947.3  
814.1  
818.8  
609.3  
442.5  
665.3  
1391.9  
670  
990.4  
4282.6  
839.9  
1309.7  
4825.1  
1220.9  1  45  
8798.3  0.033416 1.136129  
0.384313  16.52545  
0.582272  7.56953  
23213.7  0.175676 2.108117  
0.022775 1.298195  
0.040808 1.183426  
0.03507  1.087164  
0.035272  1.728341  
0.026247  1.417361  
0.019062  0.419364  
0.02866  1.060413  
0.05996  1.558967  
0.028862  0.952455  
0.042664 0.810625  
0.184486 1.106915  
0.036181 2.134692  
0.056419  4.62638  
0.207856  2.90998  77 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
CR Ratios  
28.46252  
31.46979  
38.39349  
50.78139  
41.60704  
59.94852  
38.49699  
40.615  78 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
88.84454  
34.95077  
46.12091  
34  
34.54002  
37.11316  
31.33956  79 
47.91522 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
29.8394  
25  
35.47744  
28.16654  
45.42746  
27  
42.05329  
35.31046  80 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
32  
28  
18  
19.26934  
20.70645  
26.99204  
57.18757  
18.02904  81 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios  (Continued):  
40.01537  
48.72197  
37.26988  
39.98495  
32.10775  
14.05691  
12.08778  
40.31689  
59.35699  82 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
29.56897  
58.62565  
47.80286  
38.64699  
20.05917  
22.97609  83 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
68.7199  
78.28726  
66.34482  
42.81969  
52  
60.19841  
77  84 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
68.7199  
78.28726  
66.34482  
42.81969  
52  
60.19841  
77  85 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
68.7199  
78.28726  
66.34482  
42.81969  
52  
60.19841  
77  86 
24.4024 
Calculation of Concentration Ratios (Continued):  
45  
25.23111  87 
Section A6. Calculation of Growth Rates:  
Numbering  Census 90 Code SIC Code All Employees 1990 
1  100  201  422 
2  101  202  155.6 
3  102  203  248.6 
4  110  204  127.8 
5  111  205  213.5 
6  112  206  99.5 
7  120  208  185.4 
8  121  207  31.1 
209  182.4 
9  130  21  49.3 
10  132  225  205.8 
11  140  226  62.2 
12  141  227  61, 
13  142  221  91.3 
222  76.8 
223  17.4 
224  23.9 
228  102.6 
14  150  229  51.4 
15  152  239  204.9 
16  161  267  242.2 
17  162  265  209.6 
18  171  271  475.2 
19  180  282  180.5 
20  181  283  237.3 
21  182  284  159.8 
22  190  285  61.2 
23  191  287  55.8 
24  192  281  138.1 
286  154.9 
289  99.9 
25  200  291  117.9 
26  220  311  14.8 
27  230  241  84.8 
28  231  242  198.1 
243  262.2 
29  241  244  45.2 88 
Calculation of Growth Rates  (Continued):  
249  85.5 
30  242  25  507.4 
31  250  321  17 
322  83.2 
323  60.1 
32  251  324  18.1 
327  206.6 
33  252  325  35.8 
34  261  326  38.9 
35  270  331  276.4 
36  271  332  132.5 
37  281  342  131.4 
38  282  344  427.3 
39  290  345  95.9 
40  291  346  225.2 
41  292  348  75 
42  300  341  50.2 
343  59.8 
347  120.5 
349  237.5 
43  310  351  89.4 
44  311  352  105.8 
45  312  353  229.2 
46  320  354  330.6 
47  331  355  159.3 
356  247.7 
358  177.6 
359  320.8 
48  340  363  124.1 
49  351  371  813.1 
50  352  372  712.5 
51  360  373  187.8 
52  361  374  33.1 
53  362  376  185.1 
54  380  386  99.6 
55  381  387  10.9 
56  390  394  103.8 
57  391  39  273 
excl 394 89 
Calculation of Growth Rates (Continued):  
All Employees 1980 Grt-10 year % GRT  
358.4  
174.8  
245.5  
143.7  
230.3  
108.3  
234.3  
44.1  
164.9  
68.9  
223.9  
73.7  
54.4  
150  
116.2  
19.1  
23  
125  
62.5  
175.6  
219.6  
204.9  
419.9  
204.8  
196.1  
140.9  
65.1  
72  
161.3  
173.9  
93.3  
154.8  
19.2  
87.5  
214.8  
206  
42.5  
0.1774554 17.74554  
-0.10984  -10.984  
0.0126273 1.262729  
-0.110647 -11.0647  
-0.072948 -7.29483  
-0.081256 -8.12558  
-0.208707 -20.8707  
-0.294785 -29.4785  
0.1061249 10.61249  
-0.28447  -28.447  
-0.08084 -8.08397  
-0.156038 -15.6038  
0.1213235 12.13235  
-0.391333 -39.1333  
-0.339071 -33.9071  
-0.089005 -8.90052  
0.0391304 3.913043  
-0.1792  -17.92  
-0.1776  -17.76  
0.1668565 16.68565  
0.1029144 10.29144  
0.022938 2.293802  
0.131698  13.1698  
-0.118652 -11.8652  
0.2100969 21.00969  
0.1341377 13.41377  
-0.059908 -5.99078  
-0.225  -22.5  
-0.143831 -14.3831  
-0.109258 -10.9258  
0.0707395 7.073955  
-0.238372 -23.8372  
-0.229167 -22.9167  
-0.033143 -3.31429  
-0.077747 -7.77467  
0.2728155 27.28155  
0.0635294 6.352941  
Avg DE  Col H Sums 
390.2 
165.2 
247.05 
135.75 
221.9 
103.9 
209.85 
37.6  211.25 
173.65 
59.1 
214.85 
67.95 
57.7 
120.65  372.65 
96.5 
18.25 
23.45 
113.8 
56.95 
190.25 
230.9 
207.25 
447.55 
192.65 
216.7 
150.35 
63.15 
63.9 
149.7  410.7 
164.4 
96.6 
136.35 
17 
86.05 
206.45  440.55 
234.1 
43.85  130.55 90 
Calculation of Growth Rates (Continued):  
87.9  
465.8  
18.3  
124.3  
44.8  
30.9  
204.3  
45.6  
47.4  
511.9  
208.8  
163.7  
506.4  
108.8  
260.2  
63.4  
74.9  
71.1  
101.4  
259.3  
135.2  
169.1  
389.3  
398.3  
194.4  
299.5  
174.5  
336.6  
161.9  
788.8  
633.1  
220.5  
70.8  
111.3  
134.6  
22.3  
117  
301  
-0.027304  -2.73038  
0.0893087  8.930872  
-0.071038 -7.10383  
-0.330652  -33.0652  
0.3415179  34.15179  
-0.414239  -41.4239  
0.011258 1.125795  
-0.214912  -21.4912  
-0.179325  -17.9325  
-0.460051  -46.0051  
-0.365421  -36.5421  
-0.197312  -19.7312  
-0.156201 -15.6201  
-0.118566 -11.8566  
-0.134512  -13.4512  
0.1829653  18.29653  
-0.329773 -32.9773  
-0.158931 -15.8931  
0.1883629  18.83629  
-0.084073 -8.40725  
-0.338757 -33.8757  
-0.374335  -37.4335  
-0.411251  -41.1251  
-0.169972  -16.9972  
-0.180556  -18.0056  
-0.172955  -17.2955  
-0.017765  1.776504  
-0.04696  -4.694  
-0.233477  -23.3477  
0.0308063  3.080629  
0.1254146  12.54146  
-0.148299  -14.8299  
-0.532486 -53.2486  
0.6630728  66.30783  
-0.26003  -26.003  
-0.511211 -51.1211  
-0.112821  -11.2821  
-0.093023 -9.30233  
86.7 
486.6 
17.65  173.85 
103.75 
52.45 
24.5  229.95 
205.45 
40.7 
43.15 
394.15 
170.65 
147.55 
466.85 
102.35 
242.7 
69.2 
62.55  487.35 
65.45 
110.95 
248.4 
112.3 
137.45 
309.25 
364.45 
176.85  955.2 
273.6 
176.05 
328.7 
143 
800.95 
672.8 
204.15 
51.95 
148.2 
117.1 
16.6 
110.4 
287 91 
Calculation of Growth Rates (Continued):  
Weights  GRT*Weight % GRT 
0.177988  -0.05247 3.476778 
0.822012  0.087236 
0.323762  - 0.1267 -27.1124 
0.258956  - 0.0878 
0.048974  - 0.00436 
0.062928  0.002462 
0.30538  - 0.05472 
0.3645  -0.05243 -7.92523 
0.400292  -0.04374 
0.235208  0.016639 
0.468619  - 0.03643 10.85355 
0.531381  0.144969 
0.335887  0.021339 0.320589 92 
Calculation of Growth Rates (Continued):  
0.664113  
0.101524  
0.596779  
0.301697  
0.106545  
0.893455  
0.128347  
0.134298  
0.22766  
0.509695  
0.185144  
0.286432  
0.184307  
0.344116  
- 0.01813  
- 0.00721 -10.1503  
- 0.19733  
0.103035  
-0.04414 -3.40766  
0.010058  
- 0.04233 -6.36382  
- 0.02134  
0.042883  
- 0.04285  
- 0.03343 -0.09585  
- 0.04954  
0.003274  
-0.01615  93 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
Section A7. Calculation of Employees per Est.(E):  
Census 90 Code SIC Codes SIC 4digit  Employees 1990  
100  201  2011  422  
2013  
2015  
101  202   2021  155.6  
2022  
2023  
2024  
2026  
102  203   2032  248.6  
2033  
2034  
2035  
2037  
2038  
110   204  2041  127.8  
2043  
2044  
2045  
2046  
2047  
2048  
111  205   2051  213.5  
2052  
2053  
112  206  2061  99.5  
2062  
2063  
2064  
2066  
2067  
2068  
120  208   2083  185.4  
2084  
2085  
2086  
2087  
121  207   2074  31.1  94 
Calculation of E  (Continued): 
2075  
2076  
2077  
2079  
209  2091  182.4  
2092  
2095  
2096  
2097  
2098  
2099  
130  21  2111  49.3  
2121  
2131  
2141  
132  225  2251  205.8  
2252  
2253  
2254  
2257  
2258  
2259  
140  226  2261  62.2  
2262  
2269  
141  227  2273  61  
142  221  2211  91.3  
222  2221  76.8  
223  2231  17.4  
224  2241  23.9  
228  2281  102.6  
2282  
2284  
150  229  2295  51.4  
2296  
2297  
2298  
2299  
152  239  2391  204.9  
2392  
2393  
2394  95 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
2395  
2396  
2397  
2399  
161  267   2671  242.2  
2672  
2673  
2674  
2675  
2676  
2677  
2678  
2679  
162  265  2652  209.6  
2653  
2655  
2656  
2657  
171   271  2711  475.2  
180  282   2821  180.5  
2822  
2823  
2824  
181  283  2833  237.3  
2834  
2835  
2836  
182  284   2841  159.8  
2842  
2843  
2844  
190  285  2851  61.2  
191  287  2873  55.8  
2874  
2875  
2879  
192  281   2812  138.1  
2813  
2816  
2819  
286  2861  154.9  
2865  96 
Calculation of E  (Continued):  
2869  
289  2891  99.9  
2892  
2893  
2895  
2899  
200  291  2911  117.9  
210  311  3111  14.8  
230  241  2411  84.6  
231  242  2421  198.1  
2426  
2429  
243  2431  262.2  
2434  
2435  
2436  
2439  
241  244  2441  45.2  
2448  
2449  
249  2491  85.5  
2493  
2499  
242  25  2511  507.4  
2512  
2514  
2515  
2517  
2519  
2521  
2522  
2531  
2541  
2542  
2591  
2599  
250  321  3211  17  
322  3221  83.2  
3229  
323  3231  60.1  
251  324  3241  18.1  
327  3271  206.6  97 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
3272  
3273  
3274  
3275  
252  325  3251  35.8  
3253  
3255  
3259  
261  326  3261  38.9  
3262  
3263  
3264  
3269  
270  331  3312  276.4  
3313  
3315  
3316  
3317  
3321  
271  332  3322  132.5  
3324  
3325  
281  342  3421  131.4  
3423  
3425  
3429  
282  344  3441  427.3  
3442  
3443  
3444  
3446  
3448  
3449  
290  345  3451  95.9  
3452  
291  346  3462  225.2  
3463  
3465  
3466  
3469  
292  348  3482  75  
3483  98 
Calculation of E  (Continued):  
3484  
3489  
300  341  3411  50.2  
3412  
343  3431  59.8  
3432  
3433  
347  3471  120.5  
3479  
349  3491  237.5  
3492  
3493  
3494  
3495  
3496  
3497  
3498  
3499  
310  351  3511  89.4  
3519  
311  352  3523  105.8  
3524  
312  353  3531  229.2  
3532  
3533  
3534  
3535  
3536  
3537  
320  354  3541  330.6  
3542  
3543  
3544  
3545  
3546  
3547  
3548  
3549  
331  355  3552  159.3  
3553  
3554  
3555  99 
Calculation of E  (Continued):  
3556  
3559  
356  3561  247.7  
3562  
3563  
3564  
3565  
3566  
3567  
3568  
3569  
358  3581  1776.6  
3582  
3585  
3586  
3589  
359  3592  320.8  
3593  
3594  
3596  
3599  
340  363  3631  124.1  
3632  
3633  
3634  
3635  
3639  
351  371  3711  813.1  
3713  
3714  
3715  
3716  
352  372  3721  712.5  
3724  
3728  
360  373  3731  187.8  
3732  
361  374  3743  33.1  
362  376  3761  185.1  
3764  
3769  
380  386  3861  99.6  ] 00 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
381  387  3873  10.9  
390  394  3942  103.8  
3944  
3949  
391  39  3911  273  
excl 394  3914  
3915  
3931  
3951  
3952  
3953  
3955  
3961  
3965  
3991  
3993  
3995  
3996  
3999  101 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
Number of Companies Aggregated # of Co's.  
1328  2819  
1207  
284  
44  1797  
508  
124  
469  
652  
183  1534  
462  
107  
344  
194  
244  
237  1781  
33  
48  
120  
31  
130  
1182  
1948  2367  
316  
103  
31  942  
14  
14  
623  
173  
8  
79  
15  1623  
469  
48  
846  
245  
31  3687  102 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
47  
20  
194  
67  
153  
579  
110  
277  
503  
196  
1510  
9  
16  
23  
62  
139  
375  
806  
58  
304  
216  
79  
184  
245  
176  
419  
246  
316  
106  
247  
241  
121  
49  
180  
9  
111  
181  
519  
1215  
860  
252  
1251  
110  
1977  
605  
419  
1326  
1000  
6946  103 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
682  
1535  
266  
885  
91  
369  
424  
76  
374  
78  
203  
170  
743  
180  
952  
137  
57  
461  
7473  
288  
58  
6  
46  
208  
640  
137  
174  
683  
669  
184  
648  
1121  
117  
55  
307  
233  
27  
103  
70  
427  
52  
131  
2528  
1787  
7473  
398  
1159  
2184  
1121  
712  
3512  10d  
Calculation of E (Continued):  
491  
537  
77  
224  
7  
1366  
200  
311  
11852  
5252  
696  
219  
2640  
3644  
274  
131  
831  
304  
1678  
198  
456  
158  
3223  
2771  
1030  
374  
721  
80  
175  
625  
291  
465  
1833  
566  
443  
1569  
65  
35  
362  
1324  
123  
975  
200  
311  
11852  
13687  
6017  
10943  
1786  
7670  105 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
2687  
3749  
56  
80  
167  
95  
111  
58  
48  
32  
43  
104  
748  
271  
25  
274  
156  
155  
692  
27  
120  
270  
131  
732  
128  
1127  
2334  
1428  
1584  
4078  
1300  
486  
496  
1610  
834  
379  
72  
596  
46  
2702  
75  
66  
431  
975  
1573  
417  
2118  
11706  
2444  
3795  
346  106 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
146  
59  
161  
118  
90  
161  
540  
3353  
1702  
310  
332  
144  
372  
304  
1066  
97  
679  
3720  
68  
224  
1576  
149  
872  
293  
563  
158  
703  
165  
448  
381  
196  
812  
7207  
1736  
183  
83  
203  
292  
475  
280  
256  
408  
13149  
292  
1725  
3202  
11093  
31901  107 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
483  
2438  
333  
113  
223  
445  
415  
251  
342  
262  
1159  
97  
80  
746  
70  
897  
132  
331  
133  
118  
21414  
65  
40  
11  
201  
28  
61  
352  
657  
2306  
308  
144  
137  
372  
925  
547  
2108  
150  
19  
27  
61  
717  
406  
3767  
1434  
2655  
150  
107  
717  108 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
213  213  
191  2597  
698  
1708  
2294  11547  
205  
437  
402  
106  
141  
611  
108  
753  
247  
293  
3676  
213  
14  
2047  109 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
E  
149.6984746364  
86.588759042849  
162.05997392438  
71.757439640651  
90.198563582594  
105.62632696391  
114.23290203327  
8.4350420395986  110 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
448.18181818182  
104.0971168437  
102.80991735537  
145.58472553699  
68.853695324284  
51.4  
29.498992225741  111 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
95.806962025316  
117.29155008394  
63.588920112405  
453.5175879397  
204.74547023296  
73.168498168498  
54.594112399643  
78.370786516854  
39.322323462415  11.2 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
589.5  
47.588424437299  
7.1380357745528  
14.473588076277  
7.5120491939505  
46.367540893722  
9.518477043673  
2.3598435462842  113 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
83.062645011601  
39.897435897436  
175.71519389701  
317.74580335731  
62.039660056657  
36.502648214591  
39.238952536825  
59.341238471673  
216.76300578035  114 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
3.8177808198342  
306.16438356164  
61.333333333333  
71.58026233604  
29.80257820247  
4.9935738691577  115 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
305.66502463054  
215.84815503053  
496.86192468619  
70.734463276836  
220.66666666667  
1729.9065420561  
138.91213389121  116 
Calculation of E (Continued):  
51.173708920188  
39.96919522526  
23.642504546635  Section A9: Re-estimation of Oster's Model Using Ols (Table 8)  
Occupation 
Accountants 
t(35) 
R 2= 0.1877, a 2= 0.0485 
Engineers 
t(46) 
R 2= 0.2542, R2= 0.1407 
Managers 
t(49) 
R 2= 0.2920, R 2= 0.2053 
Personnel 
t(31) 
R 2= 0.1893, R 2= 0.0324 
Computer Scientists 
and Operators 
t(42) 
R 2= 0.2050, i. 2= 0.0693 
Natural Scientists 
t(19) 
R 2.-- 0.1814, a  R2=- 0.1201 
Designers 
t(24) 
R 2= 0.3440, R2= 0.1800 
Technicians 
t (49) 
R2= 0.1516, it2.0.0477 
Intercept  A /M  MP  GRT  E  WT  SD  NCD 
16.106  -0.063  -0.0027  0.002  -15.561  2.62  -13.15 
(2.536)**  (-1.091)  (-0.051)  (0.482)  (-1.298)  (0.351)  (-1.533) 
1.1477  -0.2978  0.0029  0.0091  -0.000005  -1.736  0.3394  -0.644 
(2.284) **  (-0.449)  (0.569)  (2.157)**  (-0.110)  (-1.649)  (0.571)  (-0.994) 
2.3816  0.02244  0.01454  -0.00089  -1.787  -0.0375  -1.463 
(2.889)** *  (2.975) * * *  (2.317) * *  (-1.468)  (-1.270)  (-0.039)  (-1.400) 
5.176  -0.0095  0.126  -0.0015  -7.797  11.95  3.42 
(0.759)  (-0.146)  (2.067)**  (-0.290)  (-0.553)  (1.299)  (0.398) 
0.0614  -1.791  -0.0046  0.009  -0.004  7.69  4.0136  -0.56 
(-1.361)  (-0.181)  (0.422)  (-1.714)*  (1.397)  (1.213)  (-0.158) 
8.628  -3.021  0.022  0.068  -0.003  -11.82  -6.24  -7.04 
(1.432)  (-0.998)  (0.377)  (1.110)  (-0.586)  (-1.217)  (-0.888)  (-0.837) 
2.4147  0.00775  -0.0157  0.00195  -9.836  13.2032  -9.6953 
(0.458)  (0.145)  (-0.307)  (0.476)  (-0.985)  (1.925)*  (-1.395) 
-0.5392  0.0271  0.0093  -0.0014  1.1986  6.58  1.39 
(-0.213)  (1.045)  (0.445)  (-0.693)  (0.0269)  (2.178)"  (0.429) 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level, "at the 0.025 level, *"at the 0.005 level (Rt-tailed tests) A9. Inter-industry Ratios by Occupation (Table 9):  
Mean  Mean 
(W/M)  (Yf/Ym) 
Natural Scientists  1.39  0.73 
Accountants and  12.86  0.82  
Auditors  
Designers  0.94  0.87  
Personnel Service  5.61  0.92  
Workers  
Engineers  0.80  0.84  
Computer Scientists  1.41  0.84  
and Operators  
Technicians  2.48  0.92  
Managers  2.62  0.63  
max 57
E (,) 
where Mean(W IM)= 
4.4 
number of industries(i) 
and  
max 57 y 
E  
-m Mean (YflY.)= 
number of industries(i) 
1  1.8  